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ABSTRACT  
Separation of ownership and control creates the necessity of corporate governance mechanisms, such as Executive 
Stock Option Scheme (ESOs), which reduce the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. In spite of 
the fact that shareholders exercise their option when it is in the money, this study attempts to explore the properties of 
option exercising behavior by executives to verify any differences of trading patterns in terms of ESO granting and 
exercising. In the presence of concentrated ownership coupled with poor corporate governance structure in Malaysia, 
executives might have control over management compensation plan to benefit them rather than maximizing wealth of 
the corporations. Using data on ESO granting and exercising from 201 non-financial companies, this paper aims to 
recognize the pattern of ESO exercises by Malaysian executives affecting firm performance. We found that Malaysian 
companies are granting their ESO when market is overvalued. We also found a significant positive relationship 
between ESO exercising and firm performance for both market and accounting based performance measures. Panel 
data analysis of fixed effect estimation revealed the fact that Malaysian executives exercise their option immediately 
after they are granted; suggesting intended behavior of adopting ESOs.  
  
Keywords: Management Compensation, Executive Stock Option Scheme (ESOs), ESO Granting, ESO Exercising, 
Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) relate agency theory to Modern Corporation and form relative amount of ownership 
claims held by insiders and outsiders. Insiders are the management, and outsiders refer to the investors with no direct 
role in the management of a corporation. They formalize the survival of organizations by “separation of ownership 
and control” that dates back from Adam Smith (1776) to Berle and Means (1932). In particular, managers do not bear 
a sizeable wealth effect of their own decisions. Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in their ‘The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property’ noticed that ownership is diffused among small shareholders in the US and the control is 
concentrated with hands of managers. Consequently, shareholders experience a loss of control over their resources to 
oversee managerial activities in modern corporations. Management exercises more freedom rather if at least 
ownership is concentrated or firm is managed by its owners. Since management and ownership usually do not 
coincide, Berle and Means (1932) perceived a conflict of interests between parties. 
 
Recently, this image of one run by professional managers without accountability to shareholders clearly stuck. There 
are some evidences of concentrated ownership existence around the world. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrated 
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that there is a modest ownership concentration even in largest American firms. Holderness et al. (1998) found that 
percentage of insider ownership of US listed corporations is increasing from an average of 13% in 1935 to 21% in 
1995. The developing markets including Malaysia are characterized by an insider system of corporate governance. 
According to Claessens et al. (2000), Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysian firms are owned by a family (20% cut 
off) of 70%, 55.4% and 67.2% where firms are widely held by 10%, 5.4% and 10.3% respectively. Still, there are 
somewhat little systematic evidence about the ownership structures and the impact of it to performance of publicly 
listed firms worldwide. 
 
Malaysian corporate sector is characterized by concentrated ownership (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), pyramidal 
structures1, cross holding2; and sometimes with dual class shares3 that well-defined in family controlled firms 
(Claessens, et al., 2000). Managers usually come from the same family of large controlling shareholders where 
managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) conflicts of interests are limited. According to Zhuang (2001), Asian 
countries are characterized by concentrated ownership and weak regulatory structure leading to a weak corporate 
governance setting. With the implementation of interest alignment mechanisms such as ESOs Malaysian corporate 
scenario, therefore, suggests potential conflicts between concentrated ownership and minority shareholders of the 
firms rather than the conflicts between managers and shareholders. This study attempts to recognize the pattern of 
ESO exercised by Malaysian executives which may granted for intended reasons.  
 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
Forgoing the life span left, stock options are exercised earlier in firms when it is deep in the money or with high stock 
price volatility (Bettis, Bizjak, & Lemmon, 2005). In other words, options will be exercised early when the expected 
benefit is greater than holding it. Since managers are risk averse and the option is nontransferable, they exercise 
option before its maturity (Huddart, 1994). When option is exercised, executives bring in cash into the firm. The 
exercise pattern differs if holding period is leading to utility maximization. Thus, option values changes with differing 
incentives based on individual or firm characteristics. To capture these characteristics models are developed to verify 
the relationship between ESO exercising and firm performance of Malaysian non-financial companies after 
controlling firm specific variables. Since samples are selected purposively, panel data fixed effect analysis is adopted 
to observe the heterogeneity of ESO grants (Lam & Chng, 2006; Zhou, 2001). This study employed pooled and fixed 
effect model to ensure the best fitted model that satisfies the assumptions of Classical Linear Regression Model 
(CLRM). It also seeks to determine the industry effects a firm belongs to that may lead to better performance. The 
empirical relationships of regression equation for yearly ESO exercising as dummy variables (Hall & Liebman, 1998; 
Hillegeist & Penalva, 2003) for firm i in the year t are given bellow: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Pyramidal ownership structure shows a top down chain of control (La Porta et al. 1999) where ultimate owners are located at the top.  
2 Cross holding ownership structure is linked by horizontal cross holding of shares (Bebchuk et al. 2000) that is the situation where one company holds another 
company’s stock under same index. 
3 Dual class share represents two classes of shares with different voting rights under same ownership. 
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TQit = α + ∑β1ESOit + β2RVit + β3DRit + β4Git + β5Sit + β6DTit + Σγ7INDit + uit  (i) 
ROAit = α + ∑β1ESOit + β2RVit + β3DRit + β4Git + β5Sit + β6DTit + Σγ7INDit + uit  (ii) 
  Where, 
TQ = Tobin’s Q 
ROA = Return on Assets 
ESO = ESO Exercising yearly 
RV = Return Volatility  
DR = Debt Ratio (Leverage) 
G = Growth of the Company  
S = Size of the Company 
IND = Industry Dummy (0 or 1) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
 
A test was developed by Hausman (1978) to choose between fixed effects model and the random effects model to 
apply. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between fixed effects and random effects estimators 
significantly. Actually the test is about composite error term ωit, whether εi (random error component) is correlated 
with the explanatory variables or not. If εi is correlated with explanatory variables then applying random effects 
model will produce biased and inconsistent results. Eventually, fixed effect model will be the appropriate model to 
apply in this situation. If there is no correlation between εi and the explanatory variables, random effects model is 
suitable. The test statistic has an asymptotic Chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number 
of elements in β. If the null hypothesis is rejected, better to use the fixed effects model. Whether the error terms are 
correlated with explanatory variables or not, that can be tested by using this Hausman test when comparing the fixed 
effects model coefficients to that of generalized least square random effects model. Besides, econometric issues such 
as multicollinearity, data stationarity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation tests are revised to identify and address in the 
panel data technique.  
 
The study covers 1407 observations of Malaysian non-financial companies to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and firm specific characteristics, namely, corporate governance mechanism, firm specific risk, financial 
leverage, firm’s size, growth and date of listing (age) under varying corporate sectors. The historical or secondary 
data are used and calculated in this paper comprises Tobin’s Q, ROA, Return Volatility, Debt Ratio, Growth, Size and 
Date of Listing (Age). A longitudinal study has been employed to correlate this relationship for seven years period. 
Latest seven years period is chosen to capture the true picture concerning the movement of company’s performance 
especially after Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Since financial data that have been obtained are from audited 
financial statements (i.e. Annual Reports) and databases from reliable sources; the consistency, reliability and 
accuracy of the information are controlled. Data for ESO exercising were detected through Bursa Malaysia web 
information, Annual Reports’ of respective companies. While data for the regression variables are gathered from 
Bloomberg and Data Stream Databases. 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis  
 
Referring to the seasonality in the Malaysian stock market (Pandey, 2002), it gives a sound financial background to 
analyze executive stock options granting / exercising that executives may be able to time their options granted to 
improve returns. Therefore, our objective is to verify the relationship between Executive Stock Option (ESO) 
exercising and firm performance to explore the exercise pattern of Malaysian executives.  
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3.1 ESO Exercising Effects on Firm’s Performance (TQ) 
 
Table 1 is the results of both pooled and fixed effect regression estimations with a dummy variable of ESO exercised 
through the years to test the effect of executive stock option exercising on firm performance (TQ) with industry 
effects. The result shows the positive relationship of ESO exercised for year 2002, year 2006 and year 2007 for both 
OLS and GLS fixed effects estimators while considering industry effects of companies. Moreover, ESO exercised in 
year 2003 and Year 2004 is also significant by both pooled estimators. It is observed that option exercising by 
Malaysian executives is following the similar trends throughout the years. 
 
The risk level is measured by return volatility which exhibits consistent inverse relationship with firm performance 
and not significant. Among other control variables, leverage (debt ratio) is negatively significant at 1% level and 
growth is positively significant at 5% level for both pooled and fixed effects GLS estimators. Firm’s size is not 
significant and positively related; and age of the firm is negatively significant by both estimators at 1% significance 
level which are consistent with earlier results. 
 
 
Table 1: Pooled and Fixed Panel: ESO Exercised with Industries (TQ) 
 OLS GLS 
Variables Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed 
Intercept © 0.89*** 0.82*** 1.02*** 0.97*** 
ESO Exercised (2002) 0.09* 0.14** 0.10** 0.14** 
ESO Exercised (2003) 0.20*** 0.05 0.21*** 0.06 
ESO Exercised (2004) 0.09* 0.07 0.09** 0.07 
ESO Exercised (2005) 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 
ESO Exercised (2006) 0.29*** 0.26** 0.29*** 0.27** 
ESO Exercised (2007) 0.25*** 0.20** 0.26*** 0.20** 
Return Volatility (RV) -0.19 -0.02 -0.24 -0.08 
Debt Ratio (DR) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
Growth (G) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 
Size (S) 0.01 0.01 0.007 0.01 
Age (DT) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
Industrial Products (IP) -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.13 
Consumer Goods (CG) -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 
Consumer Service (CS) 0.28* 0.25* 0.17 0.15 
Oil and Gas (OG) 1.31*** 1.29*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 
Technology (T) 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 
Telecommunication (TC) 0.90** 0.88** 0.68** 0.66** 
Utilities (U) 0.02 -0.007 -0.008 -0.03 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 
F-statistic 15.24*** 11.98*** 14.10*** 11.16*** 
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D-W statistic 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.43 
TQit = α + β1ESO Exercised02it + β2ESO Exercised03it + β3ESO Exercised04it + β4ESO Exercised05it + 
β5ESO Exercised06it + β6ESO Exercised07it + β7RVit + β8DRit + β9Git + β10Sit + β11DTit + γ12IPit + γ13CGit + 
γ14CSit + γ15OGit + γ16Tit + γ17TCit + γ18Uit + uit 
*** 1% Significant level ** 5% Significant level * 10% Significant level 
 
 
3.2 ESO Exercising Effects on Firm’s Performance (ROA) 
 
Table 2 shows the results of both pooled and fixed effect regression estimations of a dummy variable of ESO 
exercised through the years to test the effect of executive stock option exercising on firm performance (ROA) with 
industry effects. The results show consistent positive relationship of ESO exercised for all years with both OLS and 
GLS estimators. The significant correlations of ESO exercised with performance establish the indifferent pattern of 
ESO exercising by the risk averse Malaysian executives relative to ESO granting. 
 
Return volatility exhibits consistent inverse relationship with firm performance at 1% significance level. Among other 
control variables, debt ratio and age of the firm are negatively related with firm performance by both estimators where 
debt ratio is significant at 1% level. Firm’s growth and size exhibit consistent positive significant relationship with 
performance by both estimators at 1% significance level. In terms of goodness of fit of the models, both pooled and 
fixed effect models explain similar variation to predict dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 2: Pooled and Fixed Panel: ESO Exercised with Industries (ROA) 
 OLS GLS 
Variables Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed 
Intercept © -16.25*** -15.23*** -14.94*** -14.03*** 
ESO Exercised (2002) 1.32* 1.23 1.29* 1.29 
ESO Exercised (2003) 1.04 2.69** 1.05 2.73** 
ESO Exercised (2004) 2.01*** 2.08*** 2.03*** 2.13** 
ESO Exercised (2005) 1.21 1.61* 1.27 1.67* 
ESO Exercised (2006) 2.28*** 3.23*** 2.38*** 3.33*** 
ESO Exercised (2007) 1.86 0.55 1.95* 0.64 
Return Volatility (RV) -19.54*** -21.17*** -18.45*** -20.02*** 
Debt Ratio (DR) -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
Growth (G) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
Size (S) 1.35*** 1.30*** 1.28*** 1.23*** 
Age (DT) -0.008 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Industrial Products (IP) -3.38*** -3.17*** -3.38*** -3.17*** 
Consumer Goods (CG) -2.11*** -1.95*** -2.09*** -1.93*** 
Consumer Service (CS) -1.23 -0.99 -1.43 -1.18 
Oil and Gas (OG) 2.47** 2.63*** 2.48** 2.66*** 
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Technology (T) -7.64*** -7.43*** -7.47*** -7.27*** 
Telecommunication (TC) -2.66 -2.29 -2.68 -2.32 
Utilities (U)  -5.15*** -4.78*** -5.00*** -4.66*** 
R2 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 
F-statistic 26.28*** 20.44*** 25.70*** 19.91*** 
D-W statistic 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94 
ROAit = α + β1ESO Exercised02it + β2ESO Exercised03it + β3ESO Exercised04it + β4ESO Exercised05it + 
β5ESO Exercised06it + β6ESO Exercised07it + β7RVit + β8DRit + β9Git + β10Sit + β11DTit + γ12IPit + γ13CGit + 
γ14CSit + γ15OGit + γ16Tit + γ17TCit + γ18Uit + uit 
*** 1% Significant level ** 5% Significant level * 10% Significant level 
 
 
3.3 Industry Effects 
 
In order to verify the robustness of industry effects, models are run for both accounting and market based 
performance of ESO exercising. Oil and Gas industry is still positively significant at 1% level by both performance 
measurements as ESO granted effects on firm performance. In addition, Oil and Gas has the higher contribution to the 
Malaysian Economy than other industries that validates the previous finding. On the other hand, Industrial Products, 
Consumer Goods, Technology and Utility industries exhibit significant negative relationship against firm 
performance (ROA) suggesting poor market competitions in these industries. In terms of goodness of fit of the 
models, both estimators exhibit similar variation of explaining the dependent variable. 
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The relationship between Executive Stock Option (ESO) exercising and firm performance is verified to explore the 
exercise pattern of Malaysian executives against market based as well as accounting based performance measures. It 
is found that through all the years this relationship is significant (except year 2005), conforming the fact that 
Malaysian executives exercise their option immediately after granting when it is in the money. This early exercise 
pattern of stock option is consistent with the notion that executives are usually risk averse investors. Early exercise 
pattern ignores time value of options when a greater proportion of executives’ wealth is attached to the firm 
performance. Therefore, we may conclude that Malaysian executives are risk averse as they are prone to rebalance 
their portfolios. In addition, issues behind the adoption of ESOs identify time preferences of ESO granting. It is found 
that companies are granting ESO when firm is overvalued. In other words, executives may expropriate minority 
shareholders wealth due to poor corporate governance structure in Malaysia. 
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